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Colombia is involved in preliminary philosophies regarding the acquisition of frigates in the next 10 years. 
This presents many challenges as well as opportunities. This not a unique situation as many maritime 
countries have struggled with this matter over the past 50 years. The question that quickly arises is 
whether a country should design and construct new naval ships themself or follow one or a combination 
of the many options that have been used over this period. This presentation will review these options as 
both challenges and opportunities and hopefully provide a starting point for important discussions of 
this subject.
Colombia se encuentra involucrada en filosofías preliminares en cuanto a la adquisición de fragatas en los 
próximos 10 años. Esto presenta muchos retos, así como oportunidades. Esta no es una situación única, 
debido a que muchos países marítimos han luchado con este asunto por los últimos 50 años. La pregunta 
que rápidamente surge es si el país debe diseñar y construir nuevas embarcaciones navales por sí mismo 
o seguir una o una combinación de un número de opciones que han sido utilizadas durante este periodo. 
Esta presentación revisará estas opciones tanto como retos como oportunidades, y espera brindar un 
punto de partida para entablar importantes discusiones en este tema.
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Since the end of WWII many maritime countries 
have faced the task of obtaining new naval ships 
such as a frigate. In the early time it was often 
accomplished by buying an existing frigate from 
one of the larger naval powers such as USA, 
Britain, Germany, France, Italy and Spain. Others 
preferred to obtain state of the art new ships 
from foreign sales naval shipbuilding countries, 
mainly France and Germany. More recently some 
maritime countries have decided to get involved 
in the design and building of their naval ships 
in a wide range of options as how to achieve this 
ranging from performing all the work themselves 
to varying types of partnerships with experienced 
naval shipbuilding company. Any approach 
has both challenges and opportunities for the 
acquiring country and, not surprisingly, there have 
been both successful and disastrous projects. This 
paper will use these past approaches, their successes 
and failures to provide a decision database for 
continuing discussion of this important factor in 
obtaining new naval ships today for a country that 
has had no previous experience in designing and 
building naval ships and specifically a frigate.
It is recognized that the final decision on which 
approach to use may be based on factors other 
than technical and cost such as social and 
political. Shipbuilding is a labor intensive industry 
which, for commercial ships, requires a modest 
financial investment and can be relatively quickly 
learned. Thus it is a relatively easy industry to 
join for countries where it can be used to offset 
unemployment. Japan, Korea and China are all 
example of this. This presentation will NOT 
address any of the social or political factors but will 
focus on the approach technical, cost, and schedule 
factors.
When a maritime country, without a significant 
current naval ship design and construction 
capability, decides that it needs to acquire new 
naval combatant ships they are immediately faced 
with a number of important decisions: should it 
be designed from scratch; if so who should design 
it; if not how to select an existing design; who 
should modify the design if changes are necessary; 
and finally who should build the ship(s)? The 
initial desire is often to design from scratch and 
by the acquiring country’s designers and to build 
the ship(s) in their own country. The reason why 
this is not often done is because the non-existing 
capability for both design and construction cannot 
support such a plan from both the cost and time 
that would be required to do so and even if these 
are acceptable the risks are great.   
A number of countries have faced this problem and 
have developed a number of approaches to achieve 
the goal of having the desired naval ships for the 
desired cost in the desired time frame. These 
approaches range as follows:
1. purchasing the complete new ship(s) from an 
experienced foreign naval shipbuilder,
2. purchasing the complete ship(s) based on an 
existing design from experienced foreign naval 
shipbuilder,
3. contracting with an experienced foreign naval 
shipbuilder to either prepare a new design or 
to select an existing design and for them to 
build the first ship with the acquiring country 
building all remaining ships with technical 
assistance from the selected shipbuilder,
4. purchasing an existing design and technical 
assistance from a foreign shipbuilder but 
building all the ships in the acquiring country, 
and
5. finally, designing from scratch and building in 
the acquiring country.
Each of these approaches has challenges and 
opportunities for the acquiring country, and it is 
the understanding and evaluation of these and the 
cost and risks involved that is essential to reaching 
the right decision (compromise). The selected 
approach may not be one of those listed above but 
a combination of them. Each case is going to be 
unique as it depends on many external factors, such 
as the country’s politic goals social and industrial 
policies and employment goals.
Introduction
Setting the stage
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Current Experience
Before addressing the challenges and opportunities 
that the program to build frigates in 10 years offers 
Colombia or any other similar country, it is useful 
to look at some of the characteristics of the naval 
shipbuilding industry around the world. Table I 
shows the breakdown of recent naval shipbuilding 
for both export and own use (Birkler et al., 2005). 
From this it can be seen that the biggest own use 
countries (USA and Britain) are not significant 
players in the export of naval ships. Germany, 
France and Russia dominate this area. Table II 
shows typical cost (2009) per Lightship ton for a 
range of naval ships as well as a few commercial 
ships for comparison.
Countries such as Britain, Germany, France and 
Italy, even though they have quite large navies, 
find the cost of designing new naval ships difficult 
to justify and have attempted to develop joint 
designs such as the European Destroyer and 
the FREM frigate to reduce the cost by sharing 
resources. That this is not without problems can 
be seen by the demise of the destroyer program 
and Britain opting out of the FREM frigate 
program (See Fig. 1). This delayed the British 
Frigate program while the Type 45 Destroyer 
program was being (Birkler et al., 2005)  executed 
but now work is underway on the Type 26 Frigate 
for the Royal Navy (see Fig. 2).
Table 1. World Naval Shipbuilding. Projected Military Ship Production, 2003-2012
Export Domestic Use
Number Value($ millions)
LSW
Tons Number
Value
($ millions)
LSW
Tons
Germany 56 10,713 96,040 21 5,799 44,144
France 25 6,405 47,570 17 13,015 146,302
Russia 20 5,000 36,025 0 0 0
Spain 6 2,035 31,343 7 2,195 26,735
The Netherlands 9 1,780 8,500 4 1,585 24,759
United Kingdom 2 650 3,000 22 17,340 235,140
United States 2 53 174 66 56,172 776,446
South Korea 1 30 1,500 7 4,905 24,500
Japan 0 0 0 16 11,090 79,125
Italy 0 0 0 18 5,289 75,170
China 0 0 0 8 3,230 26,875
Australia 0 0 0 1 650 3,051
Sweden 0 0 0 3 375 1,431
Taiwan 0 0 0 1 320 2,769
Israel 0 0 0 11 55 550
Total 121 26,666 224,152 202 122,020 1,446,997
Not Reported 23 vessels valued at $13,225 million and displacing 86,291 tons LSW.
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Comparisson of Military and Commercial Ship Cost
Average Cost per
LSW Ton ($)
Military
SSK Type 212A (German Navy)
Type 214 (export)
Scorpene (export)
Type 209-1400 (export)
346,667
323,529
141,379
103,164
SSN Virginia Class
Astute
250,000
184,615
Aircraft Carriers WASP LHD
CVN 77
69,767
67,004
Destroyers DDG 51 Class
Project 093 (Chinese)
Type 45
Project Horizon
167,644
153,846
141,343
122,000
Frigattes and Corvettes Multimission Frigate (French Navy)
MEKO ANZAK
La Fayette (export)
70,833
100,156
122,807
Patrol UK OPV for Brunei
MEKO A-100 (export)
216,667
17,625
Commercial
World Market Cruise Ship
Chemical product tanker (small)
Container ship
Oil product carrier
Bulk carrier (small)
Bulk carrier (medium)
Crude oil tanker (medium)
Jones Act crude oil tanker (medium)
10,000
2,838
3,100
1,630
1,259
884
2,203
6,925
Table 2. Typical Ship Cost (2009)
Source: Birkler et al., 2005
Fig. 1. FREM Frigate
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Fig. 2. British Type 26 Frigate
Fig. 3. Difference in Worker Skills for Commercial and Naval Ships
Many countries that want to build their own naval 
ships do so in the hope of establishing a shipbuilding 
industry within their country. They may already 
have a commercial shipbuilding capability or part 
of their plan may be to use the naval shipbuilding 
program (paid by the government) to jump start 
a commercial shipbuilding long term capability. 
Unfortunately, in both cases, this has not been too 
successful.
Some countries that have a reasonable commercial 
shipbuilding capability assume that this can be 
transferred to naval shipbuilding. Unfortunately, 
history has proven them wrong. Even the 
experience of small successful shipbuilders such as 
those involved in the LCS program in the USA, was 
not enough to enable them a successful transition 
into naval shipbuilding. That program ended up 
with the first ship costing over three times the 
original budget and twice as long to build. This is 
not a unique situation. Many naval ship design and 
constructions programs end up in similar straights
Part of the reasons for this is of the different skills 
required by the workers and the number of workers 
for naval ships compared to commercial. Fig. 3 
shows the difference in worker skills for commercial 
and naval shipbuilding and Fig. 4 shows (Birkler et 
al., 2005) the worker man-hour breakdown for a 
Destroyer compared to a 75,000 t Bulk Carrier.
Support
Transportation
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Mechanical
Electrical
Steelwork
Welding
Foreman
Engineering
Support
Administration
Distribution of Skills available diers between commercial and
military construction yards
White collar
Blue collar
0 5 10 15
Percentage of total workforce
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Source: Birkler et al., 2005
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Fig. 4. Comparison of Shipbuilding Man-hours for Commercial and Naval Ships
Fig. 5. Typical US Naval Ship Design Timeline
Outtting
Auxiliary systems
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Military Ship construction on requires a much
larger workforce
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Labour expended (thousands of man-hours)
Naval (destroyer)
Commercial 
(75000 DWT bulk carrier)
It can be seen from Figure 3 that the big differences 
are 250% more for design, 200% for supervision 
of workers and 900% for electrical. Of course this 
figure can be misleading in that there are a number 
of disciplines where the commercial shipbuilder 
has a greater percentage than the naval. The 
true manning problem is shown in Fig. 4 where 
in all cases the man-hours for the naval ship are 
many times greater (factor of 10) than that for the 
commercial ship.
Another significant difference is the design and 
building schedules between commercial and naval 
ships. A typical schedule for a new combatant ship 
from Concept Initiation to completion of Detailed 
Design is shown in Fig. 5. It is based on experience 
in the USA where the design and construction 
capability exists (no country designs and builds 
as many naval ships as the USA see Fig. 6) and 
even with all this experience and activity the US 
naval shipbuilders have problems in design and 
construction; technical, cost and schedule.  
The actual construction time that would be added 
to the design timeline for the first of a new frigate 
would be from 3 to 5 years with some overlap (start 
of construction before completion of design). So 
the total time from concept initiation to delivery 
of the first frigate would range from a minimum of 
10 years to a maximum of 16 years.
A review of a range of recent new frigate designs 
show Detailed Design time from 3 to 5 years, 
Contract Award to Start of Fabrication of 3 years, 
Start of Fabrication to Launch of 3 years and 
launch to delivery of also 3 years.
Compare these to commercial ship design schedules 
of 6 to 12 months and build schedules from 6 to 
9 months.
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Fig. 6. Recent USA Naval Shipbuilding Programs
Fig. 7. Danish Naval Construction by Commercial 
Shipyard
The recent accomplishment of the Danish Royal 
Navy and Odense Steel Shipyard is a unique and 
new approach. Fig. 8 shows what they were able 
to accomplish for the new frigate size ships of 
the ABSALON Class and the follow on frigate 
program of three ships. This was truly unique 
in that the build time was only a third of other 
programs and what is more interesting they were 
able to do so for 75% of the traditional frigate 
cost ($330M instead of $440M).
Colombia is a special situation in that it has been 
building military ships (small) for almost a decade. 
Because of shipbuilding’s importance it has been 
defined as a strategic sector by the Ministry of 
Commerce, Industry and Tourism as part of their 
Productive Transformation Program.
COTECMAR has built complex OPVs but it 
needs to continue to develop intermediate projects 
of increasing complexity in-house to acquire the 
capability to design and build their own frigate.
Experience has shown that it is not easy to enter 
shipbuilding for the first time or re-enter after a 
long absence. The recent Brazilian experience is 
an unfortunate example of this though it was for 
commercial ships
So now the stage is set to look at the specific focus 
of this paper. The rest of this presentation will 
look at the challenges and opportunities that each 
approach has in the goal to acquire a frigate in 10 
years.
For a country that has never designed or 
constructed a naval combatant ship (or a country 
that has but it is over 25 years since they designed 
and constructed the last one) the first and greatest 
challenge is to decide on the approach.
Approaches 1 and 2
The only difference between Approaches 1 and 2 
are that for 1 a new design is required whereas for 
2 the objective is to find a frigate already designed 
and constructed. As there is no in-country design 
or construction involved in these approaches 
the challenges are minimum. Though option 2 
has more risk as the desired ship has not been 
designed and constructed. The decision making is 
entirely under the control of the Navy operators. 
An acquisition team will probably be formed and 
their responsibilities are to develop the design 
requirements based on operational needs, develop 
a performance specification in the case of a new 
design or in the case of selecting an existing 
design review frigate shipbuilders products and 
end up with a list of the two or three that meet 
their requirements probably involving visits to the 
selected frigates in service or under construction. 
Then with the Navy administration, budget 
control and contractual groups, negotiate with 
the short list of shipbuilders and eventually select 
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the winning shipyard.  This will obviously involve 
the cost, build duration, delivery schedule, 
shipbuilder’s reputation, and any political factors. 
Approach 2 offers the fastest availability of the 
ships, lowest program cost and risk. Approach 1 
will take longer, involve more risk and cost more 
than Approach 2. The obvious downside of both 
these approach are that they do not do anything 
for the development of an eventual self-sustained 
naval ship design and construction capability for 
the acquiring country.
Approach 3
The objective of this approach is to save cost and 
reduce risk by having the first ship constructed by 
experienced shipbuilder. This approach has been 
used by a number of countries that wanted to 
use the program (especially submarines) to build 
up their own capability to build such ships. The 
challenge for the new design and construction 
is for it to be successfully executed and the 
construction documents well prepared for the 
follow on ships. For using an existing design 
the challenge is that the existing construction 
drawings and documents are understandable to 
the in-country shipbuilder without needing any 
rework or additional documents just to suit the 
in-country shipbuilder, which would add cost 
and extend the schedule.
Approach 4
Here the objective is to save time by not designing 
the ship and reduce technical risk in that the 
design has been proven by construction and 
operation. It eliminates the need to build up a 
large technical capability. The challenge is to 
build up the workers in numbers and skills to 
execute the construction program and avoid the 
undesirable experience of other similar programs 
in having significant cost over-run and schedule 
delay.
Approach 5
The challenges of this approach are:
•	 how to obtain required technology?
•	 how to build up to the required technical 
manning level (150 to100 for 4 to 7 years 
respectively)?
•	 how to build up to the required worker level 
(300 for 7 years assuming a 4 ship program)?
•	 what level of infrastructure should be 
developed within the country?
•	 what are the responsibilities for government, 
academia and industry?
•	 what to do with the designers and workers 
AFTER the program is complete?
This approach also has the highest technical, cost 
and delay risks. Even though the final outcome 
may achieve country’s shipbuilding capability 
goal, experience with this approach has not been 
good.
How to obtain required technology?
This may actually be the easiest of the listed 
challenges to meet. There are volumes of 
conference transactions and other technical 
forums that cover most of the technology 
required to design a state of the art frigate. 
In addition there is significant information 
and data available on the internet. One of my 
favorites is http://warships1discussionboards.
yuku.com/topic/21599/Majestic-class-frigate#.
URwucFbTncu. There are Naval Ship Design 
and Equipment Conferences held regularly 
in Europe and Asia. THERE IS NO NEED 
TO REINVENT THE WHEEL, but it is 
necessary to focus on acquiring the required key 
technologies required to achieve the country’s 
desired capabilities. The challenge is not to find 
the technology but how to have new designers 
absorb it and mold it into an integrated ship 
design. This takes time and experience to be able 
to use it to design a successful ship.
The examples of the National Shipbuilding 
Research Program in the USA and the Japanese 
Shipbuilders Association are worthwhile 
examining and adapting to the new shipbuilding 
country’s needs. Also all of the NSRP reports are 
available to non-US shipbuilders for a modest 
copying charge. Finally, the papers presented to 
maritime professional societies at meetings and 
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conferences are well documented and available to 
all at a cost.
How to build up to the required technical 
manning level?
Many countries with a limited shipbuilding 
industry obtain the technical personnel by sending 
people to universities in countries recognized as 
being significant shipbuilders. Universities such 
as MIT and Michigan in the USA and Glasgow 
and Newcastle in Britain and a number in Europe 
are well known for their acceptance of foreign 
graduates. This approach enables the developing 
country to obtain a minimum level of knowledge 
at reasonable cost and in a timely manner.
The next step is to open naval architecture 
and marine engineering programs at existing 
universities. However this takes time (at least 
three learning cycles) before it has any impact 
on the country’s ship design capability. Select 
graduates from the BS level are then sent to various 
universities around the world for graduate study. 
After graduation these Master degree graduates 
can fill the leadership role back home. Then the 
natural tendency is to start basic research and offer 
advanced degree programs. The problem with 
this approach is that it ignores the real immediate 
and near term need. When a country enters or 
re-enters shipbuilding there is little need for in-
country developed research but rather for educated 
production oriented designers, production 
planners, supervisors and managers. Therefore 
the challenge is for higher education institutions 
to resist the move to emulate foreign universities 
offering all three levels of degrees and to focus on 
the immediate and short term need for the new 
shipbuilding industry and to assist the shipbuilding 
industry by providing access to the required key 
technologies (a transfer of technology) that will 
support the shipbuilders needs.
Another approach is to send both design and 
production employees to a foreign shipbuilder to 
serve an apprenticeship for at least 3 years. The 
disadvantage of this is that their labor contribution 
is lost for this time but it is one of the surest and 
fastest ways to achieve the required knowledge and 
experience.
How to build up to the required worker level?
The development of the required worker skills 
must be developed in-country. If there are enough 
shipyards and time it can be done by the regular 
apprenticeship approach. However, to reach the 
manning level required for a 4 ship frigate program 
would take 10 years.
What is needed is a different and faster approach. 
The involvement of shipbuilding training should 
start in the high schools and continue in vocational 
colleges and then shortened apprenticeships at the 
shipyards. The challenge here is where to find the 
lecturers/trainers for such a program?
What level of infrastructure should be developed 
within the country?
Shipbuilding is an assembly industry where some 
of the components are fabricated in the shipyard 
and the remainder purchased. For commercial 
ships the proportion of purchased material and 
equipment is 60%. For naval ships it is even greater 
with the weapons and their control systems. When 
a country enters or re-enters shipbuilding the in-
country infrastructure does not exist and there is 
no choice but to utilize foreign sources. Often a 
country undertaking such an approach is doing 
so for social and political reasons and may invoke 
that a certain proportion of the manufacture of 
required components be done by new in-country 
small businesses. Typical “packaged” systems 
obtained from foreign sources are propulsion, war 
fighting including weapons, and electronics.
The decision on infrastructure should be part of 
an integrated National Shipbuilding Program. 
It should involve the development of a national 
awareness of the maritime world and its current 
and potential impact on the country. In some cases 
countries dictated that for major components, 
such as propulsion engines, the selected foreign 
engine manufacturer must set up manufacturing 
capability in the acquiring country.
What are the responsibilities for government, 
academia and industry?
The most important part of any plan involving 
the expansion of any industry within a country 
and a major success factor is how well the various 
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government, academic and industry players 
work together and also how they approach the 
shared responsibilities. The government must 
provide the overall goal for the long term plan, 
any funding that is required for government, 
academia and industry, removal of traditional 
obstacles, the building of a maritime interest 
and support by the public, programs to schools 
fostering the marine industry. The government 
should establish trade agreements with the 
countries that the industry needs to purchase 
material and equipment from. The government 
should also provide long term marketing at 
government level so the foreign competition 
is fair and thus future ship contracts can be 
won. It is also the government’s responsibility 
to monitor that the academia is providing the 
number and capability of graduates to support 
the plan. Academia has the responsibility to 
provide industry with the graduates they need to 
meet the plan. They must be open to immediate 
and short term basic and practical needs and 
not set up programs that produce well educated 
theorists that do not know how to build ships. 
What industry needs in its early development 
are graduates that can design ships and manage 
their construction. Finally, industry must work 
with the government and 
together establish a realistic approach to meeting 
the national plan, setting of milestones so that 
the plan can be monitored and changes made 
if necessary to support ultimate goal. Obviously 
it is the responsibility of industry to determine 
the numbers of designers, managers and workers 
needed to execute the immediate and long term 
program and to apply a growth plan for their 
shipyards (academia would use the projected 
numbers and needs to develop supporting 
programs). Industry must also design the ships 
and construct them
What to do with the designers and workers 
AFTER the program is complete?
This is perhaps one of the biggest challenges but 
is often ignored in the vain hope that somehow 
something else will come along to maintain the 
new shipbuilding capability after the naval ship 
program is completed.  This must be planned for. 
The usual plan is that the capability built up by 
the naval ship program can immediately allow the 
country to enter the international shipbuilding 
market. Unfortunately that often does not occur 
because of the differences between commercial 
and naval ship design and construction mentioned 
above.
Approach 1
The advantage of this approach over Approach 1 
is that it offers the county’s Navy the opportunity 
to determine and define, in a Performance 
Specification, the exact requirements that it needs 
in the frigate for its planned operations. There 
would be a limited opportunity for the Navy’s 
technical staff to learn some ship design and 
construction techniques from the overview of 
the foreign shipbuilders design and construction 
activities.
Approach 2
This approach offers little opportunity to improve 
a country’s own ship design and construction. It 
would offer the Navy to gain experience with state 
of the art frigate operations and thus the potential 
to better define its requirements for future naval 
ships.
Approach 3
The process of selecting an existing ship design 
will offer opportunities to learn from the review 
process and an evaluation of the construction 
approach will give reviewing team some 
shipbuilding knowledge. It is likely that once 
the selection is made, technical, management 
and some workers will be station in the shipyard 
during the construction of the first ship and 
they will lead the technology transfer and 
detailed building plans to their shipyard for the 
construction of follow-on ships.  This approach 
only offers limited opportunity for technology 
Opportunities
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transfer and mostly the opportunity to develop 
the ship construction process. By not starting 
construction until the building of the first 
ship is completed offers the opportunity not to 
avoid the problems of starting before the design 
is mature (> 80% complete).  This is a widely 
recognized productivity problem for many past 
new programs. Thus after completion of the 
frigate program it would offer a ship construction 
capability to construct complex ships from 
existing designs.
Approach 4
Here again the focus is on the ship construction 
capability improvement not the ship design. If an 
existing design is selected it would reduce cost 
and time before starting construction.  Thus the 
opportunity is to get the first ship faster than 
if it is a new design. If it is an existing design 
that has been constructed the risk of starting 
the construction immediately is small. If a new 
design is obtained from a foreign ship designer 
all the risk of taking care of initial ship design 
problems remain and this is coupled with the 
usual first ship construction problems in the 
country’s shipyard(s). If it is a new design there 
is the opportunity of the originating country 
to form a joint development and construction 
program with other countries, such as the FREM 
program.
Approach 5
This approach offers the greatest improvement 
opportunities for a country desiring to enter 
the shipbuilding industry, but with the 
greatest technology, cost and schedule risk. The 
opportunities are many and varied and would 
have the greatest and broadest benefit to the 
country’s supporting institutions and other 
industries.
From the cost aspect, if the acquiring labor rate 
is significantly lower (say 1/3) than existing 
naval shipbuilders labor rate then there is a 
potential of 45% saving in labor cost or 25% of 
total ship cost. This would NOT be achieved 
for the first or second ships but for the follow 
on ships.
From the technology aspect it offers the exact 
matching of defined Navy requirements. This 
would include examining the suitability of 
unique hull forms such as Trimarans (Fig. 8) 
and SWATH (Fig. 9) forms that traditional 
countries seem reluctant to use (except for USA 
LCS 2 and the recently reported new Indian 
frigate program).
It also offer the opportunity to use the latest 
and better ship design tools than were probably 
used for an existing design. By designing in-
country it will give the design staff as well as the 
education institutions the opportunity to obtain 
the latest design systems such as the British 
PARAMARINE (Fig. 10). This allows the ship 
to be designed from the inside out rather than 
to fit the required spaces into a pre-established 
hull form.
This approach would give great opportunity to 
all levels of education to establish a program 
that would meet the shipbuilding industry’s 
needs. The opportunity at the university level 
must be focused on the needs of the next 10 
years and not to copy existing universities with 
long histories of advanced teaching. The need 
in the next 10 years is for graduates that can 
help move from a non-existent or small ship 
design and shipbuilding capability to one that 
can design and construct modern ships, both 
naval and commercial. This does not need a 
lot of research. The need for research will grow 
as the long term shipbuilding industry grows. 
The warning given above is repeated here: 
THERE IS NO NEED TO REINVENT THE 
WHEEL.
A great opportunity exists for the schools 
and vocational colleges. The schools must 
promote the maritime world to its pupils and 
thus generate an interest in it. The vocational 
colleges must develop programs that provide 
the beginning of the training process for future 
shipbuilders.
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Fig. 8. LCS 2 Trimaran
Fig. 9. SWATH Hull Forms
Fig. 10. Paramarine Frigate Design
Five different approaches for acquiring naval 
ships have been presented and the challenges and 
opportunities discussed with a focus on a frigate. 
They are summarized in Table III. However, only 
the technical issues have been discussed in the 
presentation.
Conclusions
Ship Science & Technology - Vol. 7 - n.° 13 - (23-36)  July 2013 - Cartagena (Colombia)
Lamb
35
The important social and political factors have 
not and it is possible that they will be the deciding 
factors.  The social and political factors include:
•	 building up technical level,
•	 expansion of university and technical college 
attendance
•	 providing industrial work to improve 
unemployment,
•	 generating more tax revenues, and
•	 reducing outflow of money for the project 
thus reducing the imbalance of payments.
From the cost aspect, if the acquiring labor rate 
is significantly lower (say 1/3) than existing naval 
shipbuilders’ labor rate then there is a potential 
of 45% saving in labor cost or 25% of total ship 
cost. This would NOT be achieved for the first or 
second ships but for the follow on ships. This is a 
significant reason for building the naval ship in 
the acquiring county.
The preparing of a new ship design and 
engineering by the acquiring country designers 
offers the greatest long term capability generating 
opportunity but it also is a high risk approach.
Approach #4 offers the best compromise in that 
it has the lowest design risk (even if extensive 
changes are made to arrangements and weapons) 
and it offers the best potential for improving 
the acquiring country’s shipbuilding capability. 
However, the introduction of politics will affect 
the final choice.
Table 3. Ship acquisition source approach summary
Approach Description Challenges Opportunities Risk
1 Complete Purchase
New Design
Normal new program 
for foreign shipbuilder
None for acquiring country not 
even technology transfer
Next 
Lowest
2 Complete Purchase 
Existing Design
Design may not meet 
requirements and thus 
need significant change
Same as 1 but fastest acquisition 
of ships Lowest 
3 Foreign Design and 
First Ship Build
How to develop workers 
with the required skills
Saving in total cost IF acquiring 
country’s labor rate is significantly 
lower than experienced 
shipbuilder rate.
Learning in foreign shipyard and 
time to buildup own work force
Medium
4 Foreign existing or 
new Design 
Self-Build
How to overcome lack 
of experienced and 
skilled workers
Saving in total cost IF acquiring 
country’s labor rate is significantly 
lower than experienced 
shipbuilder rate.
Long term development of 
shipbuilding capability
High
5 Self-Design Self-
Build
Significant
All challenges discussed
Saving in total cost IF acquiring 
country’s labor rate is significantly 
lower than experienced 
shipbuilder rate.
To join with other countries 
who need naval ship to share 
development cost and provide 
more resources.
Long term development of 
shipbuilding capability
Highest
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If the political goal is to establish a long term 
shipbuilding capability in the country then it is 
essential that a National Shipbuilding Policy be 
established covering not only the frigate program 
but for ships both commercial and naval beyond 
that, including the education of professionals 
both technical and management, the training of 
workers, the required infrastructure, financing 
programs, etc.  its successful outcome depends on 
how well the plan is organized and how well all 
the players; government, academic and industry, 
work together.
So whatever approach is selected the challenges 
associated with that approach must be understood 
and actions taken to alleviate their adverse impact 
on the program and the opportunities that best 
fit with the selected approach must be put into 
action. The approach must be based on a broader 
longer term plan; it cannot be based only on  a 
few frigates. It must include programs parallel 
to and after the frigates that can sustain the 
resulting capability and the level of designers 
and workers. That is the plan must balance the 
capability developed for the frigates with the long 
term shipbuilding strategy. Then stick with the 
decision.  Follow the well-known dictum: PLAN 
THE WORK, WORK THE PLAN.
The presentation has deliberately been generic in 
that the contents apply to any country and naval 
combatant ship.  In this conclusion I would like 
to end by focusing on Colombia. How does it all 
affect Colombia? Fortunately Colombia is NOT 
just entering shipbuilding. In COTECMAR it 
has a shipbuilding capability that has been built 
up over the past decade. Throughout this time 
it has focused on having a strong design and 
development capability which has tackled more 
complex ships such as the OPVs and continually 
improved its knowledge in ship design and 
shipbuilding processes. 
It also has universities that offer naval architecture 
education and is currently implementing 
advanced graduate studies. Over the past few 
years Colombia has developed a national Product 
Transformation Program of which shipbuilding 
has been recognized as a strategic sector.
All this obviously reduces the challenges and 
thus risks discussed above, but there is still a level 
of challenges and many opportunities for the 
country in expanding the shipbuilding capability 
and all the related support that goes with this 
such as university education and worker training.
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